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Abstract
Consider a firm, called the buyer, that satisfies its demand over two periods by
assigning both demands to a supplier via a second-price procurement auction; call
this the Standard auction. In the hope of lowering its purchase cost, the firm is
considering an alternative procedure in which it will also allow bids on each period
individually, where there can be either one or two winners covering the two demands;
call this the Multiple Winner auction. Choosing the Multiple Winner auction over
the Standard auction can in fact result in a higher cost to the buyer. We provide a
bound on how much greater the buyer’s cost can be in the Multiple Winner auction
and show that this bound is tight. We then sharpen this bound for two scenarios
that can arise when the buyer announces his demands close to the beginning of the
demand horizon. Under a monotonicity condition, we achieve a further sharpening
of the bound in one of the scenarios. Finally, this monotonicity condition allows
us to generalize this bound to the T -period case in which bids are allowed on any
subset of period demands.
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1 Introduction
Consider a firm, called the buyer, having demand over two periods for a product upstream
in the supply chain. The buyer assigns both period demands to a supplier via a second-
price procurement (reverse) auction, i.e., a Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961). The winner
will be the supplier who submits the lowest bid, and he will be paid by the buyer not
his bid but the second-lowest bid. We will refer to this as the Standard auction. Under
normal conditions, the suppliers will be given sufficient advance notice by the buyer such
that, in formulating their bids, the suppliers can each assume that they will have full use
of their respective production capacity.
In the hope of lowering its purchase cost, the buyer is considering allowing bids on
each period demand individually in addition to the package of the two demands. Period
demand is considered to be an indivisible item. In this auction, called the Multiple Winner
auction, clearly there can be two winners covering the demands rather than just one. Here,
the buyer assigns orders to his suppliers via the generalization of the Vickrey auction to
heterogeneous goods, the VCG mechanism (Ausubel and Milgrom, 2006). Under the
VCG mechanism, each supplier reports to the buyer his costs of supplying each possible
subset of the buyer’s desired collection of items. The buyer then combines all information
from all of the bidders to determine the optimal allocation, i.e., the one in which the
buyer’s costs are minimized, which will impute who the winning bidders will be, where
each winning bidder will be paid not his bid but the incremental surplus that he brings
to the auction.
However, as is well-known, the VCG mechanism suffers from a weakness called revenue
deficiency (Ausubel and Milgrom, 2006; Rothkopf, 2007; Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006).
Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) provide a simple hypothetical example, originally presented
in Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), involving a forward auction of two items to three bidders.
Bidder 1 only desires the package of two items and it is willing to pay α > 0, whereas
bidders 2 and 3 are both willing to pay the same price for any of the two single items. The
VCG mechanism assigns the items to bidders 2 and 3 who both pay zero. Ausubel and
Milgrom point out that if the two items were instead auctioned as an indivisible set, then
there would be three bidders each willing to pay α for the set. The winner would be any
of them and would be paying α, yielding a higher revenue than in the VCG mechanism.
The revenue deficiency phenomenon can arise in a procurement environment as well,
as illustrated by the following example. A buyer needs to satisfy demand over two periods,
where the demands in the two periods are identical. There are four possible suppliers,
where none has significant holding costs. Suppliers 1 and 2 both have sufficient capacity
in period 1 to satisfy the sum of the demands in periods 1 and 2, and both have sufficient
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capacity in period 2 to satisfy demand in period 2; both suppliers face a setup cost of f >0
in each period. Suppliers 3 and 4, due to previous commitments, each have already sunk
their setup costs in both periods, but only have remaining capacity in period 1, where this
capacity is sufficient to satisfy one period of demand but not both. Thus, only suppliers
1 and 2 can participate in the Standard auction; one will be chosen the winner and be
paid f. All four suppliers can participate in the Multiple Winner auction, suppliers 3 and
4 will be chosen as winners, and both will be paid f. Thus, the buyer will be facing an
additional payment of f in the Multiple Winner over the Standard auction.
This example shows that there are cases in which the buyer will be worse off by choos-
ing the Multiple Winner auction, i.e., the buyer needs to pay more to satisfy his demand.
In this example, inventory holding costs did not come into play, nor did unit production
costs. The goal of this paper is to begin a rigorous investigation of the revenue deficiency
phenomenon in a procurement environment that takes account of all the relevant costs.
There is scarce analytic work on revenue deficiency. In the context of a procurement auc-
tion, revenue deficiency is cost excess, and in the sequel we will primarily use the latter
term.
Our contribution in this paper is to provide a bound on how much worse off the buyer
can be with the Multiple Winner auction, i.e., how large the cost excess can be. (Of
course, the cost excess can be negative.) Specifically, we first provide an upper bound on
the amount by which the cost to the buyer in the Multiple Winner auction can exceed his
cost in the Standard auction. Next, we show that this bound is tight. Then we sharpen
this bound for two scenarios that can arise when the buyer announces his demands close
to the beginning of his demand horizon, and thus the suppliers have already made some
commitments with other buyers. In the first scenario, each supplier is already committed
to producing in both periods but may have some spare production capacity in one or
both periods; in the second scenario, each supplier has available capacity in only one
period. We achieve a further sharpening of the bound in the second scenario when a
mild monotonicity condition is satisfied. Finally, this monotonicity condition allows us
to generalize the bound to the T -period case in which bids are allowed on any subset of
periods.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review
the literature on procurement auctions. In Section 3, we formally introduce the two
procurement auctions that we will be considering in the paper. In Section 4, we compare
the buyer’s purchase cost resulting from running a Multiple Winner auction versus running
a Standard auction, and then consider the two scenarios described above. In Section 5
we introduce the monotonicity condition and the additional results that can be achieved
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when the condition holds. In Section 6 we present our conclusions. All proofs appear in
the Appendices.
2 Literature review
There exists a considerable literature on procurement auctions. In this section, we re-
view the work on procurement auctions most relevant to the setting considered in this
paper, which focuses on supply chain costs, see e.g. Teich et al. (2006) and references
therein for multi-attribute auctions and e.g. Lorentziadis (2012) and references therein
for auctions of mixed populations of bidders. An exposition of procurement auctions is
provided by Bichler et al. (2006), including a description of an industrial procurement
auction conducted at Mars, Inc., which was presented by Hohner et al. (2003). Tunca
and Wu (2009) and Olivares et al. (2012) provide a number of examples of companies
and government organizations that make use of procurement auctions, including SUN
Microsystems, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Samsung, and Lucent.
Wan and Beil (2009) consider a manufacturer using a reverse auction in combina-
tion with supplier qualification screening to determine which qualified supplier will be
awarded a contract. They analytically explore the trade-offs between varying the levels of
prequalification and postqualification. Kostamis et al. (2009) consider a choice between
two auction formats where the suppliers know only their own true production cost, while
the buyer does not know the suppliers’ true production costs but does have some limited
information in that regard. Chen and Vulcano (2010) consider first- and second-price
auctions in the context of a single supplier who auctions his capacity to two re-sellers, one
of whom will have his bid revealed, and one who will keep his bid hidden after the auction.
Comparing the supply chain performance under both auction formats, the authors find
that the second-price auction leads to higher payoffs for all parties.
These aforementioned papers do not address the multi-period auction case. There are
not many papers on this topic. In fact, in the procurement auction literature, the phrase
“multi-period procurement” almost invariably refers to auctioning items sequentially via
a series of single-period auctions, as in Elmaghraby (2003), rather than auctioning them
simultaneously via a single auction for multiple periods, as we do here.
One exception is Kameshwaran et al. (2005), who touch on this idea in passing. They
consider the procurement of heterogeneous items for a single period, where each bidder
submits a single discount bid consisting of the cost for each item it offers to supply together
with a discount based on the number of items actually supplied. The authors point out,
however, that in the multi-period case these discount bids would not be appropriate, and
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that if period demand is considered to be an indivisible item, then the problem reduces to
procurement of multiple items where a package bid can express a supplier’s cost function
more efficiently.
A line of research related to the setting considered in this paper is presented in El-
maghraby (2005). In her model, a buyer seeks to purchase two units, and auctions off
the second unit after the winner of the first auction has been announced. She is inter-
ested in how suppliers bid in the presence of competitors with asymmetric production
capacity. She assumes that there are two types of bidders: “global bidders,” who have
sufficient capacity to supply both units, and “small bidders,” who can supply only one
unit. Elmaghraby performs extensive numerical analysis and concludes that adding small
bidders to the sequential auction with only global bidders may either increase or decrease
the expected procurement costs. Her innovative work opens up an interesting line of en-
quiry regarding the relationship between the production capacities of suppliers and the
procurement cost of the buyer. As pointed already, Elmaghraby’s setting is different than
ours, since she considers a sequential auction rather than a multi-period auction.
3 The two auctions
In this section we introduce the two procurement auctions that we will be comparing in
the paper. In both the Standard auction and the Multiple Winner auction, the buyer
announces to the set of suppliers S = {1, . . . , S} his demand requirements (D1, D2) over
the two periods. Period demand is considered to be an indivisible item, i.e., it has to
be delivered by a single supplier satisfying thus the so-called single-sourcing property.
Supplier production in a period occurs at the beginning of that period. We assume that
delivery in a period is received sufficiently early that it is available for use in that period.
The suppliers are assumed to have independent private values, i.e., the supplier’s payoff
depends solely on his own estimate of value and not on the other suppliers’ estimates of
value.
Supplier Cost Structure and Buyer Cost Structure. Hereafter, we will use
the term supplier’s total cost to refer to the sum of a specified supplier’s production
and holding costs, while the term buyer’s total cost will refer to the sum of the buyer’s
purchase costs and holding costs. More specifically, if supplier i produces in a period t,
then it incurs a setup cost fi and a unit production cost pi; further, it faces a production
capacity of bit. If supplier i carries inventory over from the first period to the second,
then it incurs a unit inventory holding cost hi. The buyer pays each supplier at the end of
the auction, which occurs before the beginning of period 1. If the buyer carries inventory,
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then it incurs a unit inventory holding cost H. Recall the standard supply chain principle
that unit inventory holding cost can only increase as one moves down the supply chain
(Silver et al., 1998). In our context, this means that the unit holding cost of the buyer
is at least as great as at any one of his suppliers, i.e. hi ≤ H, for all i. This principle,
together with the salient feature of the VCG mechanism that bidders will report their
true values, imply that the buyer will prefer that all inventory is kept at the suppliers.
The two auctions are defined as described below.
The Standard Auction. The buyer announces to the suppliers the demands D1
and D2. The suppliers are then asked to each submit a bid, viz., a price for supplying
both period demands in their respective periods. Let Ci be the bid price submitted by
supplier i. Here, the possible bidders are those whose production capacity in period 1 is
sufficient to meet buyer demand in period 1, and whose cumulative production capacity
in periods 1 and 2 is sufficient to meet cumulative buyer demand in periods 1 and 2.
Let w denote the winner of the Standard auction, i.e. the one with the lowest bid price
among suppliers in S. Let w− denote the winner in the Standard auction when the set of
suppliers is restricted to S\{w}. Let CS denote the cost to w associated with delivering
the demands, i.e., CS = mini∈SCi = Cw.
The buyer’s total cost in the Standard auction, J , is given by
J = CS\{w} = Cw− . (1)
The Multiple Winner auction. The buyer announces to the suppliers the demands
D1 and D2. The suppliers are then asked to each submit a set of three bids: (i) a price
for supplying period 1 demand in period 1, (ii) a price for supplying period 2 demand in
period 2, and (iii) a price for supplying both period demands in their respective periods.
These bids are considered to be exclusive-or (XOR) bids, which means that the auctioneer
can accept at most one bid from any given bidder. (See Nisan, 2006, for a discussion of
XOR bids and Bichler et al., 2011, for a discussion on bidding languages in the presence
of economies of scale and scope.) Note that a bid price can be infinite. Each supplier i is
restricted by his production capacity bit in period t. Let wt denote the winner of demand
Dt in the Multiple Winner auction, for t= 1, 2. Let W = {w1, w2} be the set of winners
in this auction and use W to denote the cardinality of set W, W = |W| = 1 or 2. Note
that if W = 1, w1 and w2 will be identical. Let C
M
S denote the total cost to w1 associated
with delivering demand D1 and to w2 associated with delivering demand D2.
The buyer’s total cost in the Multiple Winner auction, JM, is given by the buyer’s sum
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total payment to the suppliers:
JM = CMS +
∑
i∈W
(CMS\{i} − CMS ) (2)
=
{
CMS\{w1} + C
M
S\{w2} − CMS when W =2
CMS\{w1} when W =1
.
The Multiple Winner auction allows for three production possibilities: (i) D1 and D2 are
produced by a single supplier in period 1, in which case the supplier incurs an inventory
holding cost for the second period demand; (ii) D1 and D2 are produced by two different
suppliers in period 1, in which case the supplier for D2 incurs a holding cost; or (iii) D1 is
produced in period 1 and D2 is produced in period 2, which involves one or two suppliers
and no holding costs. In the sequel, we will refer to these three as policy (i), policy (ii),
and policy (iii), respectively.
We formally define the cost excess as JM− J . We present below an example of cost
excess that we will use and modify throughout the paper as a paradigm to illustrate
the concepts we develop and prove formally. In the example there are only two suppliers,
where supplier 1 does not have any capacity in period 2 and therefore must produce all the
demand in period 1. Both suppliers have the same setup costs, where the unit production
costs of supplier 1 are the lower of the two. However, when delivering in period 2, supplier
1 must produce in period 1 and pay for holding the demand in inventory, with his total
unit cost, p1+h1, higher than that incurred by supplier 2, p2.
Example 3.1 Let the demand in each period be D. There are two suppliers, each of
which faces a setup cost of 0 in each period, and a unit holding cost of 0.02. The other
supplier data are shown in the table below:
i fi pi bi1 bi2
1 0 0.100 2D 0
2 0 0.111 2D D
Recall that the setup costs are equal to zero, thus we can focus on the unit costs when
discussing all possible production options in both the Standard and the Multiple Winner
auctions.
Let us first look at the Standard auction. Due to the lack of capacity in period 2,
supplier 1 needs to carry the second demand in inventory and its total cost is equal to
C1 = 0 + 0.10 (D +D) + 0.02 (D) = 0.22D.
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On the other hand, supplier 2 has capacity in period 2 and the least costly option consists
of producing each demand in its own period
C2 = (0 + 0.111D) + (0 + 0.111D) = 0.222D.
Therefore, the winner of the Standard auction is supplier 1 with
CS = 0.22D [w=1].
Now let us look at the Multiple Winner auction. Because the setup costs are equal to
zero in the Multiple Winner auction, each demand will be allocated to the supplier with
the lowest total unit cost. This means that demand D1 will be allocated to arg min{p1, p2},
while demand D2 will be allocated to arg min{p1+h, p2}, where the total unit cost asso-
ciated with supplier 1 when delivering demand D2 is equal to p1+h since supplier 1 lacks
from capacity in period 2. Since in our problem instance p1 < p2 < p1+h, the Multiple
Winner auction will have two winners. Indeed:
CMS = min{0.10, 0.111}D + min{0.10 + 0.02, 0.111}D
= 0.10D + 0.111D = 0.211D [w1=1, w2=2].
Since there are only two suppliers and the winner of the Standard auction is supplier
1, the cost excess is given by C1−CMS . Indeed,
JM−J = CMS\{1} + CMS\{2} − CMS − CS\{1}
= CM2 + C
M
1 − CMS − C2
= C2 + C1 − CMS − C2
= C1 − CMS
Note that in both C1 and C
M
S , supplier 1 delivers D1, thus the cost excess focuses on D2
= ((0.10 + 0.02)D)− (0.111D).
This means that the cost excess is equal to 0.009D, and therefore positive. 
In the following example, we have three suppliers where one of them only has capacity
in period 2. As opposed to Example 3.1, the setup costs are discriminatory.
Example 3.2 Let the demand in each period be D ∈ [100, 125]. There are three suppli-
ers. Supplier 2 and 3 face a setup cost of 2 in each period, while supplier 1 faces a setup
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cost of 3.9. Each supplier faces a unit holding cost of 0.01. The other supplier data are
shown in the table below.
i fi pi bi1 bi2
1 3.9 0.09 2D 0
2 2 0.10 2D 0
3 2 0.07 0 D
Let us first look at the Standard auction. Due to capacity constraints, only suppliers 1
and 2 can take part in this auction. Due to the lack of capacity in period 2, they both
produce all the demand in period 1. The winner of this auction is supplier 1. Indeed:
C1 = 3.9 + 0.09 (D +D) + 0.01 (D) = 3.9 + 0.19D
C2 = 2 + 0.10 (D +D) + 0.01 (D) = 2 + 0.21D.
Since D ≥ 100, we have that
CS = 3.9 + 0.19D [w=1].
Now let us look at the Multiple Winner auction. We may notice that the unit inventory
holding costs are the same for all suppliers, and that when capacity is available in period
1, this is large enough to produce both demands in period 1. We conclude that policy (ii)
is dominated by policy (i), and only two production possibilities need to be considered in
the Multiple Winner auction, policy (i) and policy (iii). Therefore:
CMS = min {min
i
{fi + pi(D1+D2) + hi(D2)}, min
i, i′
{(fi + piD1) + (fi′ + pi′D2)}}
= min {3.9 + 0.19D [w1=w2=1],
min{3.9 + 0.09D, 2 + 0.10D}+ (2 + 0.07D)}
Since D ≤ 125, we have that
= min {3.9 + 0.19D [w1=w2=1],
(2 + 0.10D) + (2 + 0.07D) [w1=2, w2=3]}
Since D ≥ 100, we have that
= 4 + 0.17D [w1=2, w2=3].
Thus, the lowest cost policy is policy (iii), with supplier 2 producing D1 and supplier 3
producing D2 in period 2.
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The cost excess is given by:
JM−J = CMS\{2} + CMS\{3} − CMS − CS\{1}
= CMS\{2} + C
M
S\{3} − CMS − C2
After we eliminate supplier 3, policy (iii) is infeasible and supplier 1 produces both demands
= CMS\{2} + C1 − CMS − C2
= (CMS\{2} − CMS ) + (C1 − C2)
After we eliminate supplier 2, D1 will be reallocated to supplier 1
= ((3.9 + 0.09D)− (2 + 0.10D)) + (1.9− 0.02D)
= (1.9− 0.01D) + (1.9− 0.02D)
= (3.8− 0.03D).
Since D ∈ [100, 125], the cost excess ∈ [0.05, 0.8], and therefore, it is positive. 
As discussed earlier, although revenue deficiency has been observed in other contexts,
bounds have rarely if ever been discussed. In the following two sections, we provide upper
bounds on the cost excess in the procurement context.
4 Bounding the cost excess
This section is devoted to bounding the cost excess. In Section 4.1, we provide an upper
bound on the cost excess of the Multiple-Winner versus Standard auction. This bound
is given in terms of the setup costs and the suppliers inventory holding costs. As a
straightforward result, we provide an upper bound on the cost excess in terms of the setup
costs and the buyer inventory holding costs. In Section 4.2, we show by construction that
the cost excess bound is tight. Finally, in Section 4.3, we sharpen this bound for two
scenarios involving assumptions on setup costs and production capacities, respectively.
4.1 The cost excess bound
In the following result we present an upper bound on the cost excess for arbitrary demands,
costs, and capacities.
Theorem 4.1 The cost excess is bounded from above as follows:
JM−J ≤ max{max
i ∈ S
fi,max
{ D1
D1+D2
,
1
2
}[
(max
i ∈ S
hi)D2 −min
i ∈ S
fi
]
}. (3)
10
In the previous theorem, the second part of the bound is a fraction of the difference
between the largest inventory holding costs associated with demand D2 and the cheapest
setup cost. The following two examples illustrate this part of the bound.
The example below is in line with Example 3.1, though the cost figures are slightly
different and D1 ≤ D2.
Example 4.2 Let the demands be (D−ε,D), where 0 < ε < D. There are two suppliers,
each of which faces a setup cost of 0 in each period, and a unit holding cost of 0.02. The
other supplier data are shown in the table below.
i fi pi bi1 bi2
1 0 0.100 2D 0
2 0 0.110 2D D
Let us first look at the Standard auction. As in Example 3.1, supplier 1 needs to carry the
second demand in inventory while for supplier 2 the cheapest option consists of producing
each demand in its own period, and
C1 = 0 + 0.10 (D−ε+D) + 0.02 (D) = 0.22D − 0.10 ε,
C2 = 0 + 0.11 (D−ε) + 0 + 0.11 (D) = 0.22D − 0.11 ε.
Thus, the winner of this auction is supplier 2 with:
CS = 0.22D − 0.11 ε [w=2].
As in Example 3.1, in the Multiple Winner auction each demand will be allocated to
the supplier with the lowest total unit cost. Thus:
CMS = min{0.10, 0.11} (D−ε) + min{0.10 + 0.02, 0.11} (D)
= 0.10 (D−ε) + 0.11 (D)
= 0.21D − 0.10 ε [w1=1, w2=2].
Since there are only two suppliers and the winner of the Standard auction is supplier
2, the cost excess is given by C2 − CMS , which is equal to the difference in costs incurred
when supplying D1:
JM−J = C2 − CMS
= 0.11 (D−ε)− 0.10 (D−ε)
= 0.01 (D−ε),
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which is clearly positive.
It is easy to see that the cost excess is below D1
D1+D2
[
(maxi ∈ S hi)D2 − mini ∈ S fi
]
.
Indeed:
D1
D1+D2
[
(max
i ∈ S
hi)D2 −min
i ∈ S
fi
]
=
D − ε
D − ε+D 0.02D
=
2D
2D − ε 0.01 (D−ε)
≥ 0.01 (D−ε)
= JM−J .
Moreover, if ε ↓ 0 then JM−J ↓ 0.01D = 1
2
[
(maxi ∈ S hi)D2 −mini ∈ S fi
]
. 
In the following example, we illustrate the need of 1
2
in the bound in Theorem 4.1, by
showing that there exists a class of problem instances such that the cost excess satisfies
max
{
max
i ∈ S
fi,
D1
D1+D2
[
(max
i ∈ S
hi)D2 −min
i ∈ S
fi
]}
< JM−J ≤ 1
2
[
(max
i ∈ S
hi)D2 −min
i ∈ S
fi
]
.
(4)
Obviously, D1
D1+D2
< 1
2
, and thus in such a problem instance D1<D2. Again, the problem
instance is in line with that one in Example 3.1, though the cost figures are slightly
different, the setup costs are discriminatory and D1<D2.
Example 4.3 Let the demands be (D, 2D), where D ∈ [225, 250]. There are two suppli-
ers, each of which faces a unit holding cost of 0.022. The other supplier data are shown
in the table below.
i fi pi bi1 bi2
1 1 0.100 3D 0
2 1.95 0.111 D 2D
Let us first look at the Standard auction. The timing of production is similar to that in
Example 3.1, and
C1 = 1 + 0.10 (D+2D) + 0.022 (2D) = 1 + 0.344D,
C2 = 1.95 + 0.111 (D) + 1.95 + 0.111 (2D) = 3.9 + 0.333D.
Since D ≤ 250, the winner of this auction is supplier 1 with:
CS = 1 + 0.344D [w=1].
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In the Multiple Winner auction, it is easy to see that policy (ii) is dominated by policy
(i), as both suppliers have the same unit inventory holding cost and supplier 2 is more
expensive in terms of setup as well as unit production costs. Therefore:
CMS = min
{
min
i
{fi + pi(D1+D2) + hi(D2)}, min
i, i′
{(fi + piD1) + (fi′ + pi′D2)}
}
= min
{
1 + 0.344D [w1=w2=1], min
i, i′
{(fi + piD1) + (fi′ + pi′D2)}
}
Using again that supplier 2 is more expensive in terms of setup and unit production costs
= min {1 + 0.344D [w1=w2=1], (1 + 0.10 (D)) + (1.95 + 0.111 (2D)) [w1=1, w2=2]}
= min {1 + 0.344D, 2.95 + 0.322D}
= 2.95 + 0.322D [w1=1, w2=2],
where the last equality follows since D ≥ 225. Thus, the lowest cost policy is policy (iii),
with supplier 1 producing D1 and supplier 2 producing D2 in period 2.
Since there are only two suppliers and the winner of the Standard auction is supplier
1, the cost excess is given by C1−CMS :
JM−J = C1 − CMS
= (1 + 0.344D)− (2.95 + 0.322D)
= 0.022D − 1.95,
which is positive since D ≥ 225.
Now we will show that the cost excess satisfies (4) showing the need of max
{
D1
D1+D2
, 1
2
}
in the cost excess bound. Clearly, we only need to show the inequality of the left hand
side. Indeed:
max
{
max
i ∈ S
fi,
D1
D1+D2
[
(max
i ∈ S
hi)D2 −min
i ∈ S
fi
]}
= max
{
1.95,
D
D+2D
(0.022 (2D)− 1)
}
= max
{
1.95,
1
3
(0.044D − 1)
}
Since D ≥ 225, the maximum is achieved at the second term and
< 0.022D − 1.95
= JM−J ,
and the desired inequality follows. 
13
The following result is a corollary to Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.4 The cost excess is bounded from above as follows:
JM−J ≤ max
{
max
i ∈ S
fi, max
{ D1
D1+D2
,
1
2
}[
H D2 −min
i ∈ S
fi
]}
.
4.2 Tightness of the cost excess bound
In this section we show that the worst case bound found in Theorem 4.1 cannot be
improved. We will do this by finding a class of problem instances for which the cost
excess is indeed equal to (3). Since the bound is the maximum of two terms, we will prove
the result in two steps.
In the following proposition we show that the first part of the bound in Theorem 4.1
is tight.
Proposition 4.5 There exists a class of problem instances for which the cost excess is
equal to
JM−J = max
i ∈ S
fi.
In the following proposition we show that the second part of the bound in Theorem
4.1 is tight.
Proposition 4.6 There exists a class of problem instances for which the cost excess is
equal to
JM−J = max
{ D1
D1+D2
,
1
2
}[
H D2 −min
i ∈ S
fi
]
.
The following result is a corollary to Propositions 4.5 and 4.6.
Corollary 4.7 The cost excess bound given in Theorem 4.1 is tight.
4.3 Sharpening the cost excess bound
We consider in this section two scenarios that can arise when the buyer announces his
demands close to the beginning of his demand horizon, and thus the suppliers have already
made some commitments with other buyers. In the first scenario, each supplier is already
committed to producing in both periods but may have some spare production capacity in
one or both periods. In the second scenario, each supplier has available capacity in only
one period.
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In the first scenario, where each supplier is already committed to production in both
periods, this means that the production setup costs for each supplier are already sunk
and thus can be taken to be zero. We will in fact prove the proposition in a slightly more
general form where the setup costs can be nonzero but equal across suppliers.
If the setup costs are supplier-independent, the bound on the cost excess in Theorem
4.1 can be improved, where max
{
D1
D1+D2
, 1
2
}
is replaced by D1
D1+D2
.
Proposition 4.8 If the setup costs are supplier-independent and equal to f , the cost
excess is bounded from above as follows:
JM−J ≤ max
{
f,
D1
D1+D2
[
HD2 − f
]}
.
Moreover, this bound is tight.
If, indeed, f=0, we then have the following two corollaries.
Corollary 4.9 If the setup costs are equal to 0, the cost excess is bounded from above as
follows:
JM−J ≤ D1D2
D1+D2
H.
Moreover, this bound is tight.
Corollary 4.10 If the setup costs are equal to 0, the cost excess is bounded from above
as follows:
JM−J ≤ 1
2
max{D1, D2}H.
Moreover, when the demands are equal, this bound is tight.
If each supplier has capacity available to him in only one period, the bound on the
cost excess in Theorem 4.1 can be improved further.
Proposition 4.11 If each supplier has capacity available to him in only one period, the
cost excess is bounded from above as follows:
JM−J ≤ max
{
max
i ∈ S
fi,
D1
D1+D2
[
H D2 −min
i ∈ S
fi
]}
.
Moreover, this bound is tight.
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5 A monotonicity condition
We consider now a monotonicity condition. This condition is satisfied, for instance, when
the holding costs are a fixed percentage of the unit production costs, see Silver et al.
(1998):
Monotonicity Condition. For each i, i′ ∈ S, if pi ≤ pi′ then hi ≤ hi′ .
Under this monotonicity condition, we derive below a bound on the cost excess when
capacity is only available in one period, and show its tightness. These results are derived
for the general T -period case. As a corollary, and when the number of periods is equal to
2, we show that the bound in Proposition 4.11 can be sharpened.
Proposition 5.1 In the T -period case, if each supplier has capacity in only one period
and the monotonicity condition is satisfied, the cost excess is bounded from above as fol-
lows:
JM−J ≤ (W−1) max
i ∈ S
fi.
The following example illustrates the necessity of the monotonicity condition.
Example 5.2 Consider the 2-period case. Let the demand in each period be D. There
are two suppliers, each of which faces a setup cost of 0 in each period and no capacity in
period 2. The other supplier data are shown in the table below where 0 < δ
2
< ε < δ < h.
i fi pi hi bi1 bi2
1 0 p h 2D 0
2 0 p+ ε h− δ 2D 0
Clearly, the monotonicity condition is violated since p1 < p2 but h1 > h2.
The bound given in Proposition 5.1 is clearly equal to zero, as all the setup costs
are equal to zero. In the following, we will show that the cost excess for this problem
instance is positive and thus, the monotonicity condition is a necessary requirement in
that proposition.
Let us first look at the Standard auction. Due to the lack of capacity in period 2, both
suppliers need to carry the second demand in inventory and
C1 = 0 + p (D +D) + h (D) = (2 p+h)D
C2 = 0 + (p+ε) (D+D) + (h−δ) (D) = (2 p+h)D + (2 ε−δ)D.
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Since ε > δ
2
, the winner of the Standard auction is supplier 1 with
CS = (2 p+h)D [w=1].
Now let us look at the Multiple Winner auction. Because the setup costs are equal to
zero, in the Multiple Winner auction each demand will be allocated to the supplier with
the lowest total unit cost. Since in our problem instance p1 < p2 < p2+h2 < p1+h1, the
Multiple Winner auction will have two winners. Indeed:
CMS = min{p1, p2}D1 + min{p1+h1, p2+h2}D2
= p1D + (p2+h2)D
= pD + (p+ ε+ h− δ)D
= (2 p+h)D − (δ−ε)D [w1=1, w2=2].
Since there are only two suppliers and the winner of the Standard auction is supplier
1, the cost excess is given by C1−CMS , thus:
JM−J = C1 − CMS
= (δ − ε)D
> 0
since ε < δ. 
The following result is a corollary to Proposition 5.1, where the number of winners in
the Multiple Winner auction is bounded by min{S, T}.
Corollary 5.3 In the T -period case, if each supplier has capacity in only one period and
the monotonicity condition is satisfied, the cost excess is bounded from above as follows:
JM−J ≤ (min{S, T}−1) max
i ∈ S
fi.
Thus, the cost to the buyer of the Multiple Winner auction cannot exceed that of the
Standard auction by more than the following quantity: The smaller of the number of
suppliers and the number of periods minus one, times the largest setup cost.
The following result shows the tightness of the bound in Corollary 5.3.
Proposition 5.4 The bound given in Proposition 5.1 is tight.
The following result is a corollary to Propositions 5.1 and 5.4, when T = 2.
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Corollary 5.5 In the 2-period case, if each supplier has capacity in only one period and
the monotonicity condition is satisfied, the cost excess is bounded from above as follows:
JM−J ≤ max
i ∈ S
fi.
Moreover, this bound is tight.
6 Conclusions
We have considered the case of a firm, called the buyer, who satisfies his demand over two
periods, by either auctioning his demand profile to the least costly supplier (the “Standard
auction”) via the Vickrey auction, or to the least costly set of suppliers, including the
possibility of package bids (“the Multiple Winner auction”), via the VCG auction. The
Multiple Winner auction can in fact result in a higher cost to the buyer than the Standard
auction. We provide a bound on how much the cost to the auctioneer of the Multiple
Winner auction can exceed the cost of the Standard auction. Further, we show via a class
of problem instances that this bound is sharp. Some of the results of the paper will hold
under more general cost functions, although the analysis becomes complex.
The bound described above is the greater of two quantities. The first quantity is
the maximum possible supplier setup cost. The second quantity is the maximum cost
incurred by any supplier in holding the second period demand over from the first period,
minus the minimum possible setup cost, where this difference is multiplied by the first
period demand over the sum of the demands or by 1/2, whichever is larger. This bound
is based on information the buyer is likely to know to a reasonable degree. Of course, the
buyer knows his own demands. Further, he is likely to understand the technology of his
suppliers to the extent that he would be able to estimate their setup costs. The supplier
holding costs can be estimated by the buyer’s own holding cost which, by a standard
supply chain assumption, will dominate the suppliers’ holding costs.
Our further results are derived for two scenarios that can arise when the buyer an-
nounces his demands close to the beginning of his demand horizon, and thus the suppliers
may have already made commitments with other buyers. In the first scenario, the setup
costs are supplier-independent. We find that we can improve the earlier bound. In the
second scenario, each supplier has capacity available only in a single period. We find
that we can improve the earlier bound in this scenario as well. If, in addition, a mild
monotonicity assumption holds, we can further improve the bound, and show that this
bound holds not only in the 2-period case, but in fact holds in the general T -period case.
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For each of these improvements, we show that the bound is sharp.
One may ask what factors drive the results. We saw in the introduction an example
with four suppliers, where two suppliers have essentially unlimited capacity in both peri-
ods, while the other two suppliers have capacity only in period 1. In this example, the two
capacity-constrained suppliers have already sunk their setup costs in both periods—and
can therefore be assumed to be zero—and their remaining capacity is only sufficient to
satisfy one period demand for each of them. We found here that the revenue deficiency
equals the setup cost. However, even if the setup costs do not play a role, e.g., they
are sunk, revenue deficiency may still occur. In Section 4, we considered the case of two
suppliers, where the first supplier has essentially unlimited capacity in the first period
and no remaining capacity in the second period, while the second supplier has remaining
capacity in each period that is sufficient to satisfy one period of demand. In this example,
the unit production cost of the second supplier exceeds the unit production cost of the
first supplier by half of the unit inventory holding cost. This scenario results in a revenue
deficiency equal to half the cost of holding the second period demand over from the first
period.
Finally, Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) point out that, since truthful reporting is a
dominant strategy under the VCG mechanism, the suppliers have no incentive to spend
resources learning about competitor values’ or strategies’. Our results bring in a new
dimension from the point of view of the buyer. Specifically, the buyer would have a clear
incentive to spend resources learning about the production capacities of his suppliers, as
well as whether they engage in resource pooling. Chod and Rudi (2006) describe how,
when making capacity, inventory, and production decisions, firms are typically uncertain
about future market conditions, and that the opportunity cost associated with the quan-
tity decisions made under uncertainty can often be mitigated by various resource pooling
strategies, i.e., arrangements in which independent firms trade or subcontract capacity.
Chod and Rudi (2006) point out that this practice is widespread in the telecommunica-
tions, pharmaceutical, and electronics manufacturing industries. The significance of this
in our context is that, with resource pooling the suppliers could be considered in some
circumstances to be virtually uncapacitated. Thus, a buyer sourcing via procurement
auctions would have a clear incentive to spend resources learning to what extent this
practice is common among his suppliers.
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Appendix
The proofs of the results of the paper are given at the end of the appendix. In the following
we establish an upper bound on the cost excess when either w or w− is not a winner of
the Multiple Winner auction. This cost excess bound is shown for a general T . Before
we show this result, we require several technical results. The following lemma is a trivial
observation about a scenario for which the cost excess clearly must be nonpositive.
Lemma A.1 In the T -period case, if the Multiple Winner auction has only one winner,
then JM ≤ J .
Proof: If the Multiple Winner auction has only one winner, then clearly this should be
the winner of the Standard auction, i.e., W = {w1} = {w}. Now the costs excess is
clearly nonpositive. Indeed:
JM−J = CMS\{w} − CS\{w} ≤ 0.
2
In the following we analyze the case in which the Multiple Winner auction has at least
two winners. In the following we introduce some notation that will be used throughout
this appendix. Let T′ ⊆ T be a subset of period demands. Since w is the winner of the
Standard auction, it has enough capacity to produce T′. Let Cw(T
′) denote the total cost
to w in Cw incurred when delivering the demands in T
′. Notice that Cw(T
′) may include
costs incurred in periods outside T′. Even further, Cw(T
′) may include setup costs shared
with period demands outside T′. Similarly, we can define Cw−(T
′). Finally, let Ti denote
the set of demands won by supplier i ∈ W in the Multiple Winner auction, where CMS,i
denotes the cost to i of supplying its allocation Ti.
In the following, we give a useful expression of the cost excess JM−J .
Lemma A.2 In the T -period case, the expression of JM−J is equal to
JM−J =
∑
i∈W
[CMS\{i} − (CMS − CMS,i)]− Cw− . (5)
Proof: From equation (2) and equation (1), we have that:
JM−J = CMS +
∑
i∈W
(CMS\{i} − CMS )− Cw−
=
∑
i∈W
CMS,i +
∑
i∈W
(CMS\{i} − CMS )− Cw−
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=
∑
i∈W
[CMS,i + (C
M
S\{i} − CMS )]− Cw−
=
∑
i∈W
[CMS\{i} − (CMS − CMS,i)]− Cw− .
2
The following lemma gives an upper bound on the costs CMS\{i}, i ∈W, when either w
or w− 6∈W.
Lemma A.3 In the T -period case, the following cost relationships hold:
Cw−(Ti) + (C
M
S − CMS,i) ≥ CMS\{i} i ∈W, w− 6∈W
Cw(Ti) + (C
M
S − CMS,i) ≥ CMS\{i} i ∈W, w 6∈W.
Proof: We will establish these inequalities by finding an allocation of the period demands
in the Multiple Winner auction in the absence of supplier i ∈W, based on the optimal
allocation of the period demands in the Multiple Winner auction.
Let us first assume that i ∈ W with w− 6∈ W. This means that i 6= w−. The right
hand side of the inequality corresponding to this case is by definition the lowest cost of
supplying all the demands in the Multiple Winner auction when supplier i is not present.
In the absence of i, all the demands allocated to him, Ti, can be assigned to w−. Since
w− 6∈W, Ti can be produced using any production plan, as long as it does not violate
the capacity constraints faced by w−. We will assume that the production timing of the
period demands in Ti will be the same as the one used by w− when being responsible for
all period demands. Therefore the costs incurred by w− will be by definition Cw−(Ti).
Demand in the remaining periods is supplied under the optimal allocation CMS , at a cost
of CMS − CMS,i, and the desired inequality follows.
The proof is similar for i ∈W with w 6∈W. We just need to assign the demands in
Ti to w. 2
The following lemma bounds the cost excess when either w or w− is not a winner in
the Multiple Winner auction.
Lemma A.4 In the T -period case, if either w or w− is not a winner in the Multiple
Winner auction
JM−J ≤ (W−1) ( max
i ∈ S
fi).
Proof: Suppose w− 6∈W, i.e. Tw− = ø. By Lemma A.2, the cost excess can be written
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as:
JM−J =
∑
i∈W
[CMS\{i} − (CMS − CMS,i)]− Cw−
=
∑
i∈W
[CMS\{i} − (CMS − CMS,i) + (−Cw−(Ti) + Cw−(Ti))]− Cw−
=
∑
i∈W
[CMS\{i} − (CMS − CMS,i)− Cw−(Ti)] +
∑
i∈W
Cw−(Ti)− Cw− , by Lemma A.3
≤ 0 +
∑
i∈W
Cw−(Ti)− Cw− .
Thus, it is enough to show that
∑
i∈W Cw−(Ti)−Cw− is bounded by (W−1) maxi ∈ S fi.
Notice that {Ti}i∈W is a partition of the time horizon T. Second, and for all t ∈ T, the
timing of production of period demand Dt in both
∑
i∈W Cw−(Ti) and Cw− is the same,
by definition of Cw−(Ti). Therefore, the total variable production and holding costs in
both
∑
i∈W Cw−(Ti) and Cw− are the same. With respect to the setup costs, it is clear
that
∑
i∈W Cw−(Ti) incurs at least the same number of setup costs as Cw− . However, we
may need to incur an extra setup cost to start production in each subset Ti, such that
D1 6∈ Ti. Because there are W − 1 of these subsets,
∑
i∈W Cw−(Ti)−Cw− ≤ (W−1) fw− ,
and the desired bound follows.
A similar bound can be derived if w 6∈W. In this case, the cost excess can be bounded
by
JM−J =
∑
i∈W
[CMS\{i} − (CMS − CMS,i)]− Cw−
=
∑
i∈W
[CMS\{i} − (CMS − CMS,i)]− Cw + Cw − Cw−
≤
∑
i∈W
[CMS\{i} − (CMS − CMS,i)]− Cw
=
∑
i∈W
[CMS\{i} − (CMS − CMS,i) + (−Cw(Ti) + Cw(Ti))]− Cw
=
∑
i∈W
[CMS\{i} − (CMS − CMS,i)− Cw(Ti)] + (
∑
i∈W
Cw(Ti)− Cw).
Now the proof follows in a similar fashion as above. 2
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Proof of Theorem 4.1
The bound follows when the Multiple Winner auction has exactly one winner, see Lemma
A.1, or when either w or w− is not a winner in the Multiple Winner auction, see Lemma
A.4. Therefore, in the rest of the proof we will assume that W = {w,w−}, with w 6= w−.
In this case, the cost excess can be bounded by:
JM−J = CMS\{w} + CMS\{w−} − C
M
S − Cw−
≤ CM{w−} + C
M
{w} − CMS − Cw−
= Cw− + Cw − C
M
S − Cw−
= Cw − CMS
where this last term corresponds to the cost excess when the set of suppliers taking part
in the bidding process is equal to {w,w−}. Therefore, in the following we will assume
that S = {w,w−}.
It remains to prove that
Cw − CMS ≤ max{max
i ∈ S
fi,max
{ D1
D1+D2
,
1
2
}[
(max
i ∈ S
hi)D2 −min
i ∈ S
fi
]
}. (6)
We will prove (6) by distinguishing cases defined by the capacity faced by w and
w− and the production timing of both demands in Cw and Cw− . In particular, we will
distinguish the following three possibilities for each of the two suppliers, leaving in total
nine cases to be analyzed: (i) capacity is only available in period 1 and therefore both
demands are produced in period 1, (ii) capacity in period 1 is not enough to produce
both demands and therefore each demand is produced in its own period, and (iii) there
is enough capacity in each period and both demands are produced in period 1. We may
observe that there is one remaining possibility, i.e., there is enough capacity in each period
and each demand is produced in its own period. In this case, if this supplier is allocated
demand D2, this demand will be produced in period 2 as this is feasible and at least as
cheap as producing it in period 1. This means that the capacity in period 1 will never be
used to produce D2. Thus, it will be enough to consider possibility (ii).
Before we analyze each case, we derive a lower bound on the difference in unit pro-
duction costs, pw − pw− , based on the inequality Cw− ≥ Cw . This lower bound will be
used when bounding the cost excess. We have that:
Cw− ≥ Cw
fw− + pw− (D1+D2) + Πw− ≥ fw + pw (D1+D2) + Πw
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fw− − fw + Πw− − Πw ≥ (pw − pw−) (D1+D2)
1
D1+D2
[fw− − fw + Πw− − Πw ] ≥ pw − pw− (7)
where Πs ∈ {fs, hsD2} and s = w,w−.
1. Both w and w− each have capacity only in period 1.
This means that in Cw , Cw− and C
M
S , D2 will be produced in period 1, and all
three solutions incur inventory holding costs when delivering D2. Moreover, in C
M
S ,
D1 will be allocated to the supplier with the cheapest unit production costs, i.e.,
arg min{pw , pw−}, while D2 will be allocated to the supplier with the cheapest unit
production costs plus unit inventory holding costs, i.e., arg min{pw+hw , pw−+hw−}.
Since the Multiple Winner auction has two winners, these two suppliers should be
different, i.e.,
arg min{pw , pw−} 6= arg min{pw + hw , pw− + hw−}.
This means that either
pw ≤ pw− ≤ pw− + hw− ≤ pw + hw or (8)
pw− ≤ pw ≤ pw + hw ≤ pw− + hw− , (9)
where in both cases at least one inequality should be strict. We will analyze these
two cases separately.
(a) Suppose that (8) holds, where at least one of these inequalities is strict. This
means that in CMS , D1 is assigned to w and D2 is assigned to w−.
The cost excess now can be bounded using (7) where Πs = hsD2:
Cw − CMS = (pw D2 + hw D2)− (fw− + pw−D2 + hw− D2)
= (pw − pw−)D2 + hw D2 − hw− D2 − fw−
≤ D2
D1+D2
[fw− − fw + hw− D2 − hw D2] + hw D2 − hw− D2 − fw−
= (1− D2
D1+D2
)[(hw − hw−)D2 − fw− ]−
D2
D1+D2
fw
≤ D1
D1+D2
[hw D2 − fw− ].
(b) Suppose that (9) holds, where at least one of these inequalities is strict. This
means that in CMS , D1 is assigned to w− and D2 is assigned to w.
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The cost excess now can be again bounded using (7):
Cw − CMS = pw D1 − (fw− + pw−D1)
= (pw − pw−)D1 − fw−
≤ D1
D1+D2
[fw− − fw − (hw − hw−)D2]− fw−
=
D1
D1+D2
[(hw− − hw)D2 − fw ] + (
D1
D1+D2
− 1)fw−
≤ D1
D1+D2
[hw− D2 − fw ].
Thus, in both cases (6) follows.
2. Both w and w− have capacity in both periods but the capacity in period 1 is not
enough to produce both demands.
This means that in Cw , Cw− and C
M
S , D2 will be produced in period 2 and there-
fore no inventory holding costs are incurred. In order to prove the result, we will
distinguish two cases for the unit production costs.
Suppose that pw ≤ pw− . Because in Cw both demands are allocated to w while in
CMS one will be allocated instead to w−, in terms of total production costs Cw is as
cheap as CMS . Thus, when bounding the cost excess Cw −CMS we focus on the setup
costs, and
Cw − CMS ≤ 2 fw − (fw + fw−) = fw − fw− .
If pw > pw− , by noting that the cost excess is bounded by Cw− −CMS , we have that
Cw − CMS ≤ Cw− − C
M
S ≤ 2 fw− − (fw + fw−) = fw− − fw .
Thus, in both cases the cost excess is bounded by maxi ∈ S fi and (6) follows.
3. Both w and w− have enough capacity in both periods and produce both demands
in period 1.
This means that in CMS , D2 will be produced in period 2. Thus, C
M
S is as in Case
2. With respect to Cw and Cw− , both suppliers produce both demands in period 1,
but there is an alternative solution, at least as expensive, in which each demand is
produced in its own period as in Case 2. Now it is easy to see that the cost excess
bound derived in Case 2 applies here too.
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4. Supplier w has only capacity in period 1, while w− has capacity in both periods but
the capacity in period 1 is not enough to produce both demands.
We will distinguish two cases depending on the supplier in charge of demand D2 in
CMS .
(a) If D2 is allocated to w in C
M
S , D2 will be produced in period 1 since w has
only capacity in period 1. This means that both Cw and C
M
S incur inventory
holding costs.
The cost excess can be bounded using (7) where Πw = hw D2 and Πw− = fw− :
Cw − CMS = pw D1 − (fw− + pw−D1)
= (pw − pw−)D1 − fw−
≤ D1
D1+D2
[2 fw− − fw − hw D2]− fw−
≤ 2D1
D1+D2
fw− − fw−
=
D1 −D2
D1+D2
fw−
≤ fw− ,
and (6) follows.
(b) If D2 is assigned to w− in C
M
S , D2 will be produced in period 2, and neither
Cw− or C
M
S incur inventory holding costs. If pw ≥ pw− , as in Case 2, the cost
excess is bounded by
Cw − CMS ≤ fw− − fw
and inequality (6) follows.
Now, suppose that pw− > pw .
i. If D2 > D1, from inequality Cw− ≥ Cw we have that
Cw− ≥ Cw
2 fw− + pw−(D1+D2) ≥ fw + pw(D1+D2) + hw D2
2 (fw− − fw) + (pw− − pw)(D1+D2) ≥ −fw + hw D2
2 (fw− − fw) + 2 (pw− − pw)D2 ≥ −fw + hw D2 Since D2 > D1 :
(fw− − fw) + (pw− − pw)D2 ≥
1
2
(−fw + hw D2)
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(fw− − fw) +
1
2
(fw − hw D2) ≥ (pw − pw−)D2. (10)
The cost excess now can be bounded using (10)
Cw − CMS = (pw D2 + hw D2)− (fw− + pw−D2)
= (pw − pw−)D2 + hw D2 − fw−
≤ (fw− − fw) +
1
2
(fw − hw D2) + hw D2 − fw−
=
1
2
(hw D2 − fw),
and (6) follows.
ii. Otherwise, D2 ≤ D1. Using (7):
Cw − CMS = (pw − pw−)D2 + hw D2 − fw−
≤ 1
D1+D2
{2 fw− − fw − hw D2}D2 + hw D2 − fw−
= (1− D2
D1+D2
)hw D2 − D2
D1+D2
{fw − 2 fw−} − fw−
=
D1
D1+D2
hw D2 − 1
D1+D2
{D2 fw + (D1 −D2) fw−}
=
D1
D1+D2
[
hw D2 − {D2
D1
fw + (1− D2
D1
) fw−}
]
=
D1
D1+D2
[
hw D2 − {fw− +
D2
D1
(fw − fw−)}
]
(11)
=
D1
D1+D2
[
hw D2 − {fw + (1− D2
D1
) (fw− − fw)}
]
. (12)
If fw− ≤ fw , then D2D1 (fw − fw−) ≥ 0. Using inequality (11), the cost
excess is bounded by D1
D1+D2
[
hw D2−fw−
]
and (6) follows. Alternatively, if
fw− > fw , since D2 ≤ D1, (1− D2D1 ) (fw− − fw) ≥ 0. Using inequality (12),
(6) follows.
5. Supplier w has only capacity in period 1, while w− has enough capacity in both
periods and produces both demands in period 1.
The cost excess bound (6) will be derived using the analysis in Case 4. First, observe
that once the demands are allocated to both suppliers, the value of CMS will be the
same as in Case 4, since w− has got enough capacity in period 2 to produce D2.
Second, notice that in the proof of Case 4, Cw− is always used as an upper bound
of Cw . Therefore, (6) follows here too by noticing that Cw− can be bounded from
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above by 2 fw− + pw−(D1+D2), the value of Cw− in Case 4.
6. Supplier w has capacity in both periods but the capacity in period 1 is not enough
to produce both demands, while w− has only capacity in period 1.
It is easy to see that this case is the mirror one to Case 4. We will again distinguish
two cases depending on the supplier in charge of demand D2 in C
M
S . For ease of
presentation, we will exchange the order of the assignments, analyzing first the case
in which D2 is allocated to w− in C
M
S .
(a) If D2 is allocated to w− in C
M
S , D2 will be produced in period 1. The cost
excess can be bounded using (7) where Πw = fw and Πw− = hw− D2. Thus,
Cw − CMS = (pw − pw−)D2 + fw − fw− − hw−D2
≤ D2
D1+D2
(fw− − 2 fw + hw− D2) + fw − fw− − hw−D2
= (1− 2D2
D1+D2
) fw + (
D2
D1+D2
− 1) (fw− + hw−D2)
≤ D1 −D2
D1+D2
fw
≤ fw
and (6) follows.
(b) If D2 is assigned to w in C
M
S , D2 will be produced in period 2.
If pw− ≥ pw , the cost excess is bounded by
Cw − CMS ≤ fw − fw− .
Now, suppose that pw > pw− .
i. If D2 > D1, we have that
Cw− ≥ Cw
fw− + pw− (D1+D2) + hw− D2 ≥ 2 fw + pw (D1+D2)
fw− + hw− D2 ≥ 2 fw + (pw − pw−) (D1+D2) Since D2 > D1 :
fw− + hw− D2 ≥ 2 (fw + (pw − pw−)D1)
−fw + 1
2
(fw− + hw− D2) ≥ (pw − pw−)D1. (13)
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The cost excess now can be bounded using (13)
Cw − CMS = (fw + pw D1)− (fw− + pw−D1)
= (fw − fw−) + (pw − pw−)D1
≤ (fw − fw−)− fw +
1
2
(fw− + hw− D2)
= −fw− +
1
2
(fw− + hw− D2)
=
1
2
(hw− D2 − fw−),
and (6) follows.
ii. Otherwise, D2 ≤ D1.
Inequality (7) will be used to bound the cost excess
Cw − CMS = (pw − pw−)D1 + (fw − fw−)
≤ D1
D1+D2
(fw− − 2 fw + hw− D2) + (fw − fw−)
=
D1
D1+D2
[
hw− D2 + fw− − 2 fw +
D1+D2
D1
(fw − fw−)
]
=
D1
D1+D2
[
hw− D2 + fw− − 2 fw + (1 +
D2
D1
) (fw − fw−)
]
=
D1
D1+D2
[
hw− D2 − fw +
D2
D1
(fw − fw−)
]
(14)
=
D1
D1+D2
[
hw− D2 − fw− + (
D2
D1
− 1) (fw − fw−)
]
. (15)
If fw ≤ fw− , then D2D1 (fw − fw−) ≤ 0. Using inequality (14), (6) follows.
Alternatively, if fw− < fw , using that D2 ≤ D1, (D2D1 − 1) (fw − fw−) ≤ 0.
Using inequality (15), (6) follows.
7. Supplier w has capacity in both periods but the capacity in period 1 is not enough to
produce both demands, while w− has enough capacity in both periods and produces
both demands in period 1.
In Cw and C
M
S , D2 will be produced in period 2 and therefore no inventory holding
costs are incurred as in Case 2. With respect to Cw− , there is an alternative solution,
at least as expensive, in which each demand is produced in its own period as in Case
2. Now it is easy to see that the cost excess bound derived in Case 2 applies here
too.
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8. Supplier w has enough capacity in both periods and produces both demands in
period 1, while w− has only capacity in period 1.
The proof of this case flows as in Case 6.
9. Supplier w has enough capacity in both periods and produces both demands in
period 1, while w− has capacity in both periods but the capacity in period 1 is not
enough to produce both demands.
The argument here is similar as in Case 7. 
Proof of Proposition 4.5
Consider the following class of problem instances, where the buyer requires demands
(D,D). The number of suppliers is equal to four, i.e. S = 4, where each supplier faces
a unit production cost p and a unit holding cost h. The supplier setup costs and the
capacities are given by:
fi =
{
0 for i = 1, 2
f for i = 3, 4
(16)
bit =

D for i = 1, 2, t = i
2D for i = 3, 4, t = 1
0 otherwise,
where parameters f, p, and h are all positive.
Let us first look at the case of the Standard auction. Suppliers 3 and 4 have identical
cost and capacity structures, and are the only suppliers who have sufficient capacity to
individually produce the demands. Therefore, in the Standard auction the winner is either
supplier 3 or 4. Without loss of generality, we assume that it is supplier 3 with:
CS = C3 = f + p (D +D) + hD = f + 2 pD + hD [w = 3].
In the Multiple Winner auction, it is easy to see that the optimal allocation consists of
assigning Dt to supplier t in period t, for t = 1, 2. The cost of this allocation is:
CMS = (0 + pD) + (0 + pD) = 2 pD [w1=1, w2=2].
In the Standard auction, in the absence of supplier 3, supplier 4 delivers the demands
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with the same costs, i.e., J = CS\{3} = C4 = f + 2 pD + hD. The cost excess is equal to
JM − J = CMS\{1} + CMS\{2} − CMS − CS\{3}
= CMS\{1} + C
M
S\{2} − CMS − C4
= CMS + (C
M
S\{1} − CMS ) + (CMS\{2} − CMS )− C4
in the absence of supplier 1, the best option is to reassign D1 to supplier 3 at an extra cost of f
= CMS + f + (C
M
S\{2} − CMS )− C4
in the absence of supplier 2, we must reassign D2 to supplier 3 at an extra cost of f + hD
= CMS + f + f + hD − C4
= (2 pD) + (2 f + hD)− (f + 2 pD + hD)
= f,
and the desired result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 4.6
Consider the following class of problem instances, where the buyer requires demands
(D1, D2), where D1 ≥ D2, and thus
max
{ D1
D1+D2
,
1
2
}
=
{
D1
D1+D2
if D1 > D2
1
2
if D1 = D2.
The number of suppliers is equal to two, i.e., S = 2. Both suppliers face setup costs
equal to zero and unit holding costs equal to h. The supplier unit production costs and
capacities are given by:
pi =
{
p for i = 1
p+ h D2
D1+D2
for i = 2
bit =

D1 +D2 for i = 1, t = 1
Dt for i = 2, t = 1, 2
0 otherwise,
where parameters p and h are both positive.
Let us first look at the Standard auction. Because of the capacity structure supplier 1
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has to produce both demands in period 1, incurring a total cost equal to
C1 = 0 + (p1)D1 + (p1+h1)D2 = p (D1+D2) + hD2,
while supplier 2 must produce each demand in its own period, incurring a total cost equal
to
C2 = (0 + p2D1) + (0 + p2D2) = (p+ h
D2
D1+D2
) (D1+D2).
It is easy to see that C1 = C2 and, without loss of generality, we assume that the winner
of this auction is supplier 1, i.e.:
CS = C1 [w=1].
In the Multiple Winner auction, and because the setup costs are equal to zero, each
demand will be allocated to the supplier with the lowest total unit cost. Therefore:
CMS = min{p, p+h
D2
D1+D2
}D1 + min{p+h, p+h D2
D1+D2
}D2
= pD1 + (p+ h
D2
D1+D2
)D2
= p (D1+D2) + h
D2
D1+D2
D2.
Since there are only two suppliers and the winner of the Standard auction is supplier
1, the cost excess is given by C1 − CMS :
JM − J = C1 − CMS
= (p (D1+D2) + hD2)− (p (D1+D2) + h D2
D1+D2
D2)
= h (1− D2
D1+D2
)D2
= h
D1
D1+D2
D2.
Now the desired result follows when h = H. 
Proof of Proposition 4.8
We need to show that if the setup costs are supplier-independent the new bound for the
cost excess is equal to
max{f, D1
D1+D2
[
H D2 − f
]
}. (17)
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As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, it remains to show that the bound is valid when
W = {w,w−}. The analysis of this case was approached in the proof of Theorem 4.1 by
distinguishing nine cases depending on the capacity faced by w and w− and the timing of
the production of both demands in Cw and Cw− . In the following, we focus on the cases
in which the bound obtained in the proof of Theorem 4.1 was equal to 1
2
[
H D2 − f
]
>
D1
D1+D2
[
H D2 − f
]
, i.e., Case 4(b), Case 6(b) and Case 8(b).
We will analyze one of these cases and the rest can be handled in a similar way.
Consider Case 4(b) with pw− ≤ pw , then (17) follows. Now consider Case 4(b) with
pw− > pw . There, we distinguished two subcases depending on whether D2 > D1. If the
setup costs are supplier-independent, the bound derived for subcase D2 ≤ D1 is valid for
the D2 > D1 subcase too. Indeed, we know that
Cw − CMS = (pw − pw−)D2 + hw D2 − fw−
≤ D2
D1+D2
{2 fw− − fw − hw D2}+ hw D2 − fw−
=
D2
D1+D2
{f − hw D2}D2 + hw D2 − f
=
D1
D1+D2
{hw D2 − f}
≤ D1
D1+D2
{H D2 − f},
and (17) follows.
Finally, the tightness of the bound (17) is a straightforward corollary from Propositions
4.5 and 4.6. We simply need to notice that, in the class of problem instances used in both
propositions, the setup costs are stationary. 
Proof of Proposition 4.11
This proposition can be proved in a similar fashion to Proposition 4.8. We need to show
that if capacity is only available in one period the new bound for the cost excess is equal
to
max{max
i ∈ S
fi,
D1
D1+D2
[
H D2 −min
i ∈ S
fi
]
}. (18)
Again, it remains to show that the bound is valid when W = {w,w−}. Since capacity
is only available in one period, w and w− will enjoy their capacity in period 1. This
corresponds to Case 1 in the proof of Theorem 4.1. From that analysis, the result follows
trivially.
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To derive the tightness of the bound (18), we will use the class of problem instances
introduced in Proposition 4.6, but where supplier 2 has the same capacity pattern as
supplier 1. This means that this class of problem instances satisfies the capacity in only
one period condition. Additionally, we impose that the unit inventory holding cost of
supplier 2 is equal to zero.
Let us first look at the Standard auction. Now both suppliers have to produce both
demands in period 1, incurring a total cost equal to
C1 = 0 + (p1)D1 + (p1+h1)D2 = p (D1+D2) + hD2
C2 = 0 + (p2)D1 + (p2+h2)D2 = (p+ h
D2
D1+D2
) (D1+D2) = p (D1+D2) + hD2.
Again, C1 = C2 and, without loss of generality, the winner of this auction is supplier 1.
In the Multiple Winner auction, and because the setup costs are equal to zero, each
demand will be allocated to the supplier with the lowest total unit cost. Therefore:
CMS = min{p, p+ h
D2
D1+D2
}D1 + min{p+ h, p+ h D2
D1+D2
}D2
= pD1 + (p+ h
D2
D1+D2
)D2.
The rest of the proof flows as in Proposition 4.8, and the desired result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 5.1
From Lemma A.4, it remains to show that if w and w− are both winners of the Multiple
Winner auction, there is an alternative allocation where both period demands are assigned
to the same supplier. Suppose that w and w− ∈ W. Let s ∈ arg min{pw , pw−}. In the
remaining of the proof, we will show that there exists an alternative allocation in the
Multiple Winner auction such that the period demands in Ts′ are assigned to supplier s,
where s′ ∈ {w,w−}\{s}. Thus, in this alternative allocation either w or w− 6∈W, and
the desired result follows.
Using the monotonicity condition, we have that s ∈ arg min{pw + (t−1)hw , pw− + (t−
1)hw−}, for all t = 2, . . . , T . This means that, in terms of total unit costs associated with
each period demand, supplier s is at least as attractive as s′. Together with the fact that
capacity is only available in period 1 for both s and s′, this means that Cs′(Ts′) − fs′ ≥
Cs(Ts′)− fs. Now we have
CMS =
∑
i∈W
CMS,i
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=
∑
i∈W,i 6=s,s′
CMS,i + C
M
S,s + C
M
S,s′ Since capacity is only available in period 1:
=
∑
i∈W,i 6=s,s′
CMS,i + Cs(Ts) + Cs′(Ts′)
=
∑
i∈W,i 6=s,s′
CMS,i + fs + (Cs(Ts)− fs) + fs′ + (Cs′(Ts′)− fs′)
≥
∑
i∈W,i 6=s,s′
CMS,i + fs + (Cs(Ts)− fs) + fs′ + (Cs(Ts′)− fs)
≥
∑
i∈W,i 6=s,s′
CMS,i + Cs(Ts) + Cs(Ts′)− fs
=
∑
i∈W,i 6=s,s′
CMS,i + Cs(Ts ∪Ts′),
and thus CMS =
∑
i∈W,i 6=s,s′ C
M
S,i + Cs(Ts ∪ Ts′), and thus we have found an alternative
allocation in which s′ is not a winner of the Multiple Winner auction. 
Proof of Proposition 5.4
Consider the following class of problem instances, where the buyer requires demand vector
D ∈ RT , such that D1 > D2 > . . . > DT−1 > DT > 1. The number of suppliers exceeds
the number of periods by two, i.e., S = T+2, where each supplier faces a setup cost f and
a unit holding cost h in each period. The supplier unit production costs and capacities
are given by:
pi =
{
p+ (T−i) f for i ≤ T
p+ Tf for i = T+1, T+2
(19)
bit =

Dt for i ≤ T, t = i∑T
τ=1Dτ for i = T+1, T+2, t = 1
0 otherwise,
where parameters f, p, and h are all positive.
Now we will determine the structure of the optimal allocation in the Standard auction
and in the Multiple Winner auction. First have a look at the case of the Standard
auction. Suppliers T+1 and T+2 have identical cost and capacity structures, and are the
only suppliers who have sufficient capacity to individually produce the demand vector.
Therefore, in the Standard auction the winner is either supplier T+1 or T+2. Without
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loss of generality, we assume that it is supplier T+1 with:
CS = f +
T∑
t=1
[p+ Tf + (t−1)h]Dt [w = T+1]. (20)
In the Multiple Winner auction, it can be shown by contradiction that the optimal alloca-
tion consists of assigning Dt to supplier t in period t, for each t ∈ T (see the Appendices)
with
CMS =
T∑
t=1
(f + [p+ (T−t) f ]Dt),
= Tf +
T∑
t=1
[p+ (T−t) f ]Dt, (21)
and W = T = {1, . . . , T}.
Now we will determine the structure of the optimal allocation in the Multiple Winner
auction after the elimination of supplier t ∈ W. It can be shown by contradiction that
each demand Dτ , with τ 6= t, will be assigned to supplier τ in period τ , while the
demand Dt will be allocated without loss of generality to supplier T+1 in period 1 (see
the Appendices). This means that in determining CMS\{t} all demands, except for Dt, are
allocated in the same manner as in determining CMS . Therefore,
CMS\{t} − CMS = (f + [p+ Tf ]Dt + (t−1)hDt)− (f + [p+ (T−t)f ]Dt)
= [tf + (t−1)h]Dt for each t ∈W. (22)
In the Standard auction, in the absence of supplier T+1, supplier T+2 delivers the
demands with the same costs, i.e., J = CS\{T+1} = CT+2 = f +
∑T
t=1[p+ Tf + (t−1)h]Dt.
The cost excess is equal to
JM − J = CMS +
∑
i∈W
(CMS\{i} − CMS )− CS\{T+1}
= CMS +
∑
i∈W
(CMS\{i} − CMS )− CT+2
= CMS +
T∑
t=1
(CMS\{t} − CMS )− CT+2, and from (21) and (22) :
= (Tf +
T∑
t=1
[p+ (T−t) f ]Dt) +
T∑
t=1
[tf + (t−1)h]Dt − CT+2
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= Tf +
T∑
t=1
[p+ Tf + (t−1)h]Dt − CT+2
= (T−1) f
= (min{S, T} − 1) f,
and the desired result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 5.4: The structure of CMS and C
M
S\{t}
Here we will discuss in detail the structure of the optimal allocation in the Multiple Winner
auction and in the Multiple Winner auction after the elimination of supplier t ∈W.
Before we analyze these allocations, recall that suppliers T+1 and T+2 have identical
cost and capacity structures. When required, without loss of generality we will choose
supplier T +1. Also notice that, for this class of problem instances, the setup and the
unit inventory holding costs are the same for all suppliers; therefore when comparing two
(supplier, period) combinations we only need to discuss the unit production costs. We
have that: (a) the only supplier that can produce demand Dt in period t is supplier t,
for all t ∈ {2, . . . , T}, and (b) supplier 1 is the one having the cheapest unit production
costs in period 1. From observations (a) and (b), we can derive that (c) supplier t is the
cheapest option when producing Dt in period t, for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
We will start with CMS . In this paragraph, we will show that in the optimal allocation
for the Multiple Winner auction, every demand will be produced in the period in which
it is demanded. From this and observation (c) the desired result follows, i.e., the optimal
allocation in the Multiple Winner auction consists of assigning Dt to supplier t in period
t, for each t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Now suppose that, in the optimal allocation of the Multiple
Winner auction, there exists at least one demand that is produced in advance. Let tˆ be
the largest element in {1, . . . , T} such that Dtˆ is produced in advance. This means that
any demand Dt, with t > tˆ, will be produced in the period in which it is demanded. Since
Dtˆ is produced in advance and the demands in the future are produced in the respective
periods in which they are demanded, we know that supplier tˆ does not produce in period
tˆ. In the following, we will show that by allocating demand Dtˆ to supplier tˆ in period tˆ,
we obtain a feasible allocation which is cheaper than the current one, and this will yield a
contradiction. First, it is easy to see that this is a feasible allocation, since supplier tˆ does
not produce during period tˆ. Second, we will show that this yields a cheaper allocation.
Because demand Dtˆ is produced some time before period tˆ, the unit production cost paid
for this demand will be at least p + (T − (tˆ − 1))f . Therefore the variable production
costs incurred will be at least [p + (T − (tˆ − 1)) f ]Dtˆ. Since Dtˆ > 1, we have that this
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cost is greater than f + [p+ (T − tˆ) f ]Dtˆ, i.e., the total cost of producing Dtˆ by supplier
tˆ in period tˆ (including setup costs), a contradiction.
We will now discuss CMS\{t}, t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Since suppliers T+1 and T+2 are identical,
we will discard supplier T +2 from the rest of the proof. Using a similar argument as
for CMS , we have that demand Dτ will be produced in time by supplier τ , for all τ > t.
In the following, we will show that demand Dt will be produced in period 1 by supplier
T+1. Using a similar argument as for τ > t, this will imply that, for all τ < t, demand
Dτ will also be produced in time by supplier τ , and the desired result will follow. Now
consider the allocation of demand Dt. Suppose that Dt is not assigned to supplier T+1,
then it will be produced by supplier t˜ in period t˜ with t˜ ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}, while, and using
a similar argument as in the case of CMS , the demands indexed by {t˜ + 1, . . . , t − 1} will
be produced in the period in which they are demanded. Because of capacity constraints
of supplier t˜, demand Dt˜ will need to be produced in advance. Eventually, there will be
a single demand in the future that will need to be produced in period 1, by supplier 1
because of observation (b). Again, due to capacity constraints, D1 will need to be assigned
to supplier T +1. However, the unit production cost of supplier 1 is cheaper than that
of supplier T+1. Therefore, by exchanging the assignments of suppliers 1 and T+1, we
obtain a feasible allocation that is cheaper than the current one, a contradiction. 
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